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Invisible Laborers: Sheltered Workers Under the
National Labor Relations Act
Ellen R. Anderson*
Assembly-line workers at a plant in Minnetonka, Minnesota,
signed a petition to hold an election for union representation.1 As
one worker stated: "All we want is the same benefits as anyone
else-money to live on, to pay the bills, something to retire on
when we get old." He continued: "We're being treated as second-
class citizens, and I don't think that's fair."2 Some workers, em-
ployed for as long as twelve years, earned about one dollar per
hour after taxes.3 Wages at the shop averaged $1.30 per hour
before taxes in 1980, and decreased to $1.21 per hour in 1981.4
Although their reasons for unionizing are like those of most
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1. Minneapolis Tribune, Jan. 9, 1981, at C12, col. 1. The organizing campaign
was largely spurred by Advocating Change Together (ACT), an advocacy group
composed primarily of mentally retarded adults and current and former sheltered
workers. Id. ACT's philosophy is that those labeled as "retarded" can improve
their own lives by self-advocacy. Union Advocate, Apr. 19, 1982, at 5, col. 1.
The procedure for seeking an election is set forth in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982):
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such
regulations as may be prescribed by the Board-
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or la-
bor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial
number of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bar-
gaining and that their employer declines to recognize their repre-
sentative as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this
section . ..,
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause
to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists
shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice .... If the
Board finds upon the record of "such hearing that such a question of
representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and
shall certify the results thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1982).
2. Minneapolis Star, Dec. 9, 1981, at C1, col. 5.
3. Minneapolis Tribune, Jan. 9, 1982, at C12, col. 1.
4. Union Advocate, Apr. 19, 1982, at 5, col. 1. Wages at the shop are a percent-
age of the minimum wage, based on the workers' productivity in proportion to
"normal" workers. The figures cited were for the most productive workers, those
in the "sheltered work" program. See infra note 6. The average hourly wage was
Law and Inequality
workers, the Minnetonka workers are special. These workers are
handicapped. 5 They sought to unionize a sheltered workshop: a
workplace designed to employ people with vocational handicaps
resulting from mental, emotional, social, or physical disabilities.6
66; and 53c, respectively, for those in the "work activity" and "work component"
programs.
5. Minneapolis Star, Dec. 9, 1981, at CI, col. 5. In Minnesota, about two-thirds
of the sheltered workers are mentally retarded and one-fourth mentally ill. Pro-
gram Evaluation Division, Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor, Evaluation
of Sheltered Employment Programs ix (1984) [hereinafter cited as Minnesota Eval-
uation]. About one-third of sheltered workers in short-term programs have a sec-
ondary disability, most frequently mental retardation or epilepsy. Id. at 7. In 1983,
over one-half of those in Minnesota who recently entered long-term sheltered em-
ployment were mentally retarded, followed in frequency by mental illness and or-
thopedic handicaps such as cerebral palsy. Id. at 9. Blind workers are a small
percentage of the total. Id.
6. Minnesota Evaluation, supra note 5, at ix. Sheltered workshops are in-
tended to provide work and training for handicapped persons as they progress to-
ward competitive employment and permanent employment when competitive job
opportunities do not exist. The workshops usually receive government or private
contracts for labor-intensive assembly and packaging tasks. Id. In Minnesota, the
largest number of sheltered workers engage in "sheltered work," which provides
"transitional and long-term employment to handicapped persons who are at least
25% as productive as non-handicapped workers." Id. Sheltered work programs
serve as either part of the employment rehabilitation program or merely as a
source of employment. Id.
Individuals who are less productive can participate in "work activity" programs
(called "work component" programs if they take place in a "developmental achieve-
ment center" licensed as such by the Department of Public Welfare). Id. at 17.
These programs teach manufacturing and production skills, but productive capacity
is considered to be inconsequential. Id. Work activity programs are highly super-
vised and pressures to produce are not as strong as in "sheltered work." Id. They
can be either long-term or temporary. Id. Work activity programs usually involve
intensive vocational training. Telephone interview with Richard Seuer, social
worker (Apr. 1985). Workers in a work activity program often become "floaters,"
where workshops pull them into regular sheltered work if shorthanded. Id. Work-
ers at this level are regularly evaluated, more highly supervised and trained than
sheltered work participants, and are the subjects of periodic time studies. Id. If a
worker rises to a set productivity level, which varies from about 25% to 40% of
"normal" productivity, depending on the workshop, she or he may be moved to the
sheltered work program. Id. Workers may then be considered permanent, but usu-
ally have no guaranteed job tenure or seniority rights. Id.
The third type of program, "work adjustment training," combines training in
basic living skills such as recreation and interpersonal communication with some
training in vocational skills. Minnesota Evaluation, supra note 5, at 23. Most new-
comers to Minnesota workshops start out in a work activity program or in work
adjustment training. Telephone interview with Richard Seuer, social worker (Apr.
1985).
Workshops are also big business. In Minnesota alone, total workshop income
at workshops other than for the blind was over $46,000,000 in 1983. Minnesota
Evaluation, supra note 5, at 25. Many "private companies deal with workshops not
solely (and perhaps not at all) for altruistic reasons but because.., the workshop is
'a good place to do business.'" Brief for the National Federation of the Blind, Ami-
cus Curiae, in support of the NLRB at 39, Cincinnati Ass'n for the Blind v. NLRB,
672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982). "The workshop industry is a significant economic en-
tity not only in terms of pure scale, the types of companies involved, sales volume
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The workers' needs for better wages, benefits, and opportuni-
ties, however, are not special. Sheltered workers across the nation
earn low wages, receive negligible benefits, and are given false
promises of rehabilitation.7 Workshops legally pay workers hourly
wages ranging from a few cents to a few dollars.8
Under federal law, workshops may be exempted from the
minimum wage laws and may pay workers according to their pro-
ductivity in proportion to "normal" worker productivity.9 The
workshops determine what is "normal." Workshops commonly
abuse the process.10 For example, a supervisor reportedly stated
that the standard of normal output was inflated at his workshop:
"[B]efore the Labor Department inspectors came to check, a con-
test was held among the supervisors to see who could do the pre-
scribed work fastest: the winners were chosen to perform for the
government men.""1 One supervisor, a social worker at the work-
shop, was instructed, "See who can do the most-go as fast as you
can."'12 She explained, "It was all a secret from the Labor people.
Our bosses would stand over us... and watch us like hawks as we
did it [the assigned work] for, say, ten minutes-as fast as we possi-
bly could."'13 By multiplying this rate, she said, the workshop de-
and markets penetrated, but also in terms of the employment opportunities that
are offered there." Id.
7. See Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 6; Brief for the National Federation of
the Blind, Amicus Curiae, in support of the NLRB at 6-12, 18-23, 28-30, Cincinnati
Ass'n for the Blind v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982); Minnesota Evaluation,
supra note 5, at x, xii-xiv, 32-38; Union Advocate, Apr. 19, 1982, at 5, col. 1; Minne-
apolis Star, Dec. 9, 1981, at C1.
8. Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 6. In Minnesota the average wage for
workers in the sheltered work program was estimated at $1.66 per hour in 1984.
The average annual wage in 1983 was $2,350. Minnesota Evaluation, supra note 5,
at x.
9. Minnesota Evaluation, supra note 5, at 64. The applicable statute is part of
the Fair Labor Standards Act. 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (1982).
10. Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 6. In Minnesota the situation is compara-
ble. As described in the article, most workshops pay handicapped workers either a
percentage of the prevailing wage based on productivity or piece rate wages. Min-
nesota Evaluation, supra note 5, at 34-35. Workshops are required by the Fair La-
bor Standards Act to conduct periodic surveys to update their information on
prevailing wages in the area. Id. at 35. The Minnesota Department of Vocational
Rehabilitation does not audit workshops to determine if they have correctly estab-
lished the commensurate wage. Id. at n.2. Although the United States Department
of Labor is responsible for enforcement, studies by the General Accounting Office
have found that the Department does not vigorously enforce the law. Id. The Min-
nesota Legislative Auditor's Office, which prepared the Report on Minnesota
Workshops, stated that workshop administrators with whom it had spoken "said
that they had been audited very infrequently by the Department of Labor and that
those few audits were usually in response to a worker's complaint." Id.





rived the average hourly productivity for a "normal" worker.14
The Labor Department exempted that workshop from the mini-
mum wage laws as usual.15
At Goodwill Industries in Atlanta, a worker with epilepsy
who could assemble 1,000 boxes in a day made about $2.19 per
hour based on a piece rate.16 Working beside him, non-handi-
capped workers produced only about 300 boxes each day but
earned $2.90 per hour-a wage not determined by output.17
Workshops often justify the low wages by claiming that their
intention is to prepare workers for jobs with traditional employ-
ers.18 Most workshops, however, do not achieve that objective.
Nationally, about ten to fifteen percent of sheltered workers are
placed annually into competitive employment.19 Only 2.7% of
Minnesota's sheltered workers were placed in 1983.20 For many
sheltered workers, employment at the workshop is a full-time,
permanent job.21
In the last decade, sheltered workers have increasingly
turned to unions to help them achieve "better wages, better bene-
fits, [and] better opportunities." 22 The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), however, has denied sheltered workers the oppor-
tunity to unionize in two of the four cases that have come before
it.23 In those cases denying unionization, the Board held that the
14. Id.
15. Id. The Department of Labor, however, has enough staff to inspect only
three percent to five percent of the workshops every year, and Department officials
find substantial wage violations at one-half to two-thirds of the sites they do in-
spect. Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1979, at 1, col. 6. Many sites had never been inspected as
of late 1979. Id. Further, situations such as the disparity in wages paid to different
workers in the Goodwill workshop do not constitute violations at all. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 536 (1977).
19. This was shown in studies by the United States Department of Labor and
others in the late 1970's. Minnesota Evaluation, supra note 5, at 32. The studies
also showed that most of the workers were placed in competitive work during their
first year in the workshop. The annual rate of placement for workers who had
been in workshops for more than two years was only three percent nationally. Id.
20. Minnesota Evaluation, supra note 5, at xiii. This percentage had declined
steadily, from 7.5% in 1980, to 5.0% in 1981, to 3.6% in 1982. Id. at 32.
21. Id. at 32.
22. Unionizing campaigns led to hearings before the National Labor Relations
Board in five cases since 1976: Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 249
(1976); Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 536 (1977); Cincinnati Ass'n for the
Blind, 235 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1978); Houston Lighthouse for the Blind, 248 N.L.R.B.
1366 (1980). In Minnesota sheltered workers attempted unsuccessfully to organize
the Opportunity Workshop. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Although
other means of ameliorating the plight of sheltered workers may exist, the scope of
this article is limited to unionization as a possible solution.
23. The Board denied sheltered workers the right to unionize in Goodwill In-
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workshops provided therapeutic services rather than employ-
ment.24 Only workers who are "employees" within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act may unionize. 25
This article discusses the right of sheltered workers to union-
ize under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).26 The dis-
cussion emphasizes the ameliorative purpose of the Act-to extend
its protection to those workers who would benefit from unioniza-
tion. Part I explains the Board's approach, which denies many
sheltered workers the right to unionize. Part II evaluates the
Board's decisions and concludes that they are based on unwar-
ranted assumptions and do not accord with the purpose of the
NLRA. Part III recommends an alternative "functional" test
which is designed to promote the rights of workers under the
NLRA.27
I. Case Analysis
Since 1976, most non-profit organizations, including sheltered
workshops, fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.28 When a
dus. of S. Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 536 (1977) and Key Opportunities, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B.
1371 (1982). The Board extended the protections of the NLRA, including the right
to unionize, in Cincinnati Ass'n for the Blind, 235 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1978) and Houston
Lighthouse for the Blind, 248 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1980).
In one other decision the Board permitted sheltered workers to unionize. Chi-
cago Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 249 (1976). In that case the Board de-
termined that it had jurisdiction over the sheltered workers. Id. at 249-50. The
Board found the workshop to be within its jurisdiction and sheltered workers to be
employees, without discussing the goals of the workshop or the charity of the em-
ployer. The Board did not apply the complicated analysis it has used in the four
subsequent cases, which is the subject of this article. Instead, the Board used the
same straightforward approach that it does for non-handicapped workers. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), in which employee status
depended upon surrounding facts and the economic position of the workers (news-
boys). [This principle in Hearst was overruled to the extent that it disregarded
agency law. Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1513 (1st Cir. 1983). In 1947 Con-
gress expressly overruled Hearst only to the extent that it amended the NLRA's
definition of employee to exclude "any individual ... having the status of an in-
dependent contractor .... 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).] Chicago Lighthouse was the
Board's first decision regarding sheltered workshops since it expanded the jurisdic-
tional standard to include non-profit organizations, see infra note 28. The Board
has not followed Chicago Lighthouse in subsequent decisions. Therefore, this arti-
cle will not discuss the case in detail.
24. Key Opportunities, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1371, 1374 (1982); Goodwill Indus. of S.
Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 537 (1977).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1982).
26. The NLRA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
27. This is the purpose of the Act. See infra note 77.
28. None of the Board's decisions since 1976 has found sheltered workshops to
be outside its jurisdiction. Congress vested the Board with the fullest jurisdictional
breadth constitutionally possible under the commerce clause. NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951). "The extent to which the
Law and Inequality
workshop is within the NLRB's jurisdiction, the Board determines
the appropriateness of unionization for handicapped workers.29
Central to this question is the status of the workers as "employ-
ees." 30 Only employees have the right to unionize and engage in
collective bargaining. 31 Section 152(3) of the NLRA provides that
the "term 'employee' shall include any employee . . .unless the
Act explicitly states otherwise." 32 The Act explicitly excludes cer-
tain workers from its protection but does not affirmatively define
"employee." 33 The Act does not expressly exclude sheltered work-
Board chooses to exercise its statutory jurisdiction is a matter of administrative pol-
icy within the Board's discretion .. " NLRB v. WGOK, Inc., 384 F.2d 500, 502 (5th
Cir. 1967). Before 1976, the Board had different standards for asserting jurisdiction
over non-profit organizations and for-profit enterprises. Rhode Island Catholic Or-
phan Asylum, aka St. Aloysius Home, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1976). The worthy pur-
pose and non-profit status of an organization exempted it from Board jurisdiction,
id. at 1345, unless the organization had a "massive" impact on commerce, as op-
posed to the lesser impact needed by profit-oriented concerns. Cornell Univ., 183
N.L.R.B. 329, 332 (1970). The Board refrained from asserting jurisdiction over shel-
tered workshops because of their "close affiliation with State agencies and philan-
thropic organizations," "the limited effect on commerce of labor disputes involving
such rehabilitation centers," and because their commercial activities were "only a
means" toward their goal of "rehabilitation of employable persons." Sheltered
Workshops of San Diego, 126 N.L.R.B. 961, 964 (1960) quoted in Key Opportunities,
Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1371, 1372 n.5 (1982). Cases in which the Board refused to assert
jurisdiction over sheltered workshops before 1976 were sheltered Workshops of San
Diego, 126 N.L.R.B. 961 (1960) and Epi-Hab Evansville, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 637
(1973).
In the 1976 case, St. Aloysius Home, the Board held that it would no longer
consider an organization's "worthy purpose" as a factor in determining whether to
assert jurisdiction. 224 N.L.R.B. at 1345. The Board noted that the recent health
care amendments to § 2(2) of the NLRA deleted the only reference to the exclusion
from Board jurisdiction of charitable organizations, i.e., the one for non-profit hos-
pitals. Id. at 1344 (the Board referred to the amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982)). Thus the amendments removed any statutory basis for de-
clining jurisdiction over non-profits on the basis of their charitable function or wor-
thy purpose. Id.
In St. Aloysius Home, the Board also abandoned the "massive impact" standard
in favor of a uniform "affecting commerce" standard of selling goods in excess of
$50,000. Id. at 1345. Now the enterprises' yearly volume of business and/or
amounts of interstate inflow or outflow is the sole basis for asserting jurisdiction
over charitable and non-charitable institutions alike. St Aloysius Home, 224
N.L.R.B. at 1345.
29. Key Opportunities, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1371, 1372 (1982).
30. Id.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
33. At the time Congress was considering the major Taft-Hartley amendments
to the NLRA, the United States House of Representatives record noted: "[ain 'em-
ployee,' according to all standard dictionaries, according to the law as the courts
have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost everyone ... means
someone who works for another for hire." H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
18 (1947); see Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 167 (1971). At the same time, "employees," as used in the NLRA, "in
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ers from the definition of employee.34 The Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the Act to vest in the NLRB the authority to formulate
a "completely definitive limitation around the term 'employee.' "35
Thus, the status of sheltered workers under the Act is a matter
within the Board's discretion.
The Board has established the status of handicapped shel-
tered workers in four cases.36 Two cases, Cincinnati Association
for the Blind 37 and Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston ,38 in-
volved workshops for the blind where the visually handicapped
workers voted in favor of union representation in NLRB-approved
elections. 39 In representation hearings, the Board held that the
handicapped sheltered workers were "employees" within the
meaning of the NLRA, and therefore entitled to organize and bar-
gain collectively.40 The Board reasoned that the workers were em-
ployees in a "factual" sense because they were "treated essentially
as are regular employees in the private sector" and the workshop
"operate[d] like any manufacturing operation."41 Furthermore, be-
cause the employer's relationship with the workers was "guided to
a great extent by business considerations," collective bargaining
was appropriate for the workers.42 The Board thus permitted
workers in the two workshops to organize into unions.
In Goodwill Industries of Southern California 43 and Key Op-
the absence of specific limitation.... includes . . . in a generic sense, members of
the working class." Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 146 (6th Cir. 1977).
34. Brief for the NLRB at 24, NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston,
696 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1983).
35. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 693 n.1 (1980) (quoting NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944)). The legislative history of the
Taft-Hartley Act indicates that Congress did not explicitly list certain categories of
employees as excluded from the Act because such individuals, including managerial
and confidential employees, are "so clearly outside the Act that no specific exclu-
sionary provision was thought necessary." NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 283 (1974). Nothing in the legislative history, however, suggests that Congress
intended to place sheltered workers outside the scope of the Act. Cincinnati Ass'n
for the Blind, 672 F.2d 567, 570-71 (6th Cir. 1982).
36. See supra note 23 for identification and a brief discussion of these four
cases.
37. 235 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1978), enforcement granted, 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982).
38. 248 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1980), enforcement denied, 653 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1981),
enforced, 696 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1983).
39. Houston, 248 N.L.R.B. at 1366; Cincinnati, 235 N.L.R.B. at 1448.
40. Houston, 696 F.2d at 399; Cincinnati, 672 F.2d at 567.
41. Houston, 244 N.L.R.B. at 1147 (the court quoting a witness at the represen-
tation hearing).
42. Id. (quoting Cincinnati, 235 N.L.R.B. at 1449). The courts of appeals dealt
with the Board's Goodwill decision by distinguishing its facts from those in the
Houston and Cincinnati workshops.
43. 231 N.L.R.B. 536 (1977).
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portunities, Inc. ,44 the Board denied sheltered workers the right
to unionize. 45 Both workshops employed workers with some sort
of employment disability resulting from mental illness or retarda-
tion, physical handicap, insufficient education, or penal records.46
Goodwill's sheltered workers collected, repaired, and refurbished
discarded household items and sold them at the Goodwill stores. 47
Key's sheltered workers performed services such as manufactur-
ing, packaging, and assembly work on contract from manufactur-
ers, as well as out-of-plant services such as lawn care and wood
cutting.48 In both cases, the Board conceded that the workers may
indeed have been employees in the usual sense of the word.49 The
Board concluded, however, that to permit collective bargaining
would not effectuate the Act's purpose-to help workers increase
their bargaining power and thereby lessen the "exploitation of em-
ployee by employer."50  On the contrary, collective bargaining
would interfere with or would be irrelevant to the employer's
charitable efforts51
The Board follows a consistent framework for determining
the workers' status under the Act. Initially, the Board asks
whether sheltered workers are employees in "the generic sense of
the term." 52 Sheltered workers who "work for a set number of
hours a day, perform functions which are of recognized economic
value, and are paid for the performance of those functions" are
"generic" employees.53 Although the Board has not yet directly
44. 265 N.L.R.B. 1371 (1982).
45. Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 538; Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1374. In Key, however,
the sheltered workers were not seeking to be covered by the NLRA; their non-
handicapped supervisors were. Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1372. The supervisors were
fired for activities protected by the Act. Id. For that reason they sought coverage
so that Key could be found guilty of an unfair labor practice and be required to re-
instate the supervisors with back pay. Id. at 1376. If the sheltered workers were
found to be "employees" within the meaning of the Act, then those who direct ac-
tivities would be "supervisors" according to the Act's definition. Id. at 1372; see 29
U.S.C. § 152(1) (1982). Supervisors are specifically excluded from the coverage of
the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). Instead, the Board found that the sheltered
workers were not "employees" protected by the Act-and therefore the supervisors
were "employees" protected by the Act. Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1374.
46. Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1373; Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 537.
47. Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 536.
48. Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1373.
49. Id. at 1374; Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 537.
50. Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1374. See also Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 537.
51. Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 537-38. In Key, the Board found that collective
bargaining would be irrelevant to the employer's charitable efforts. Key, 265
N.L.R.B. at 1374.
52. Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1374 (quoting Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 537). See also
Houston, 244 N.L.R.B. at 1147; Cincinnati, 235 N.L.R.B. at 1449.
53. Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 537. See also Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1374; Houston,
244 N.L.R.B. at 1147; Cincinnati, 235 N.L.R.B. at 1449; In Cincinnati the Board was
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confronted the situation, if workers were not "generic" employees
they would not be employees protected by the Act.54
Beyond this threshold question, the workers' status depends
upon the principles that guide the workshop's operation. If a
workshop's primary goal is to benefit the workers, then the work-
ers are not employees under the Act.55 Sheltered workers are
deemed "employees" and may unionize if business considerations
guide the workshop's operation.56
To determine the prominence of business considerations, the
Board examines a workshop's method of operation and production,
its compensation levels, and its marketing strategy.5 7 In Cincin-
nati and Houston, the Board found that business motives pre-
vailed in the workshops' operation because employers' and
workers' economic interests conflicted.58 Sheltered workers faced
the same responsibilities and pressures as did ordinary employees
in blue-collar jobs and were to some extent disciplined and re-
warded according to their behavior and work records.59 Efforts at
rehabilitation were so slight that the workshop was essentially a
less explicit about its definition of generic employees. The Board emphasized that
the workers must meet quality and productivity standards; in addition, the disabled
workers shared with non-disabled employees "common supervision and substan-
tially similar terms and conditions of employment." Cincinnati, 235 N.L.R.B. at
1448-49.
54. This is clear because the Board's threshold determination is whether work-
ers are employees in the usual sense of the term. Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1374; Good-
will, 231 N.L.R.B. at 537.
55. Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1374; Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 537. In Houston and
Cincinnati the court of appeals implied disagreement with this Board premise. In
Houston, the court stated that no congressional policy holds collective bargaining to
be "totally inconsistent with rehabilitative policy." Houston, 696 F.2d at 407. The
Cincinnati court noted that Congress did not necessarily intend to keep collective
bargaining out of sheltered workshops. Cincinnati, 672 F.2d at 570-71. Even if
Congress did so intend, not all sheltered workshops are primarily therapeutic so a
blanket exemption would not be appropriate. Id. at 571. The court reasoned that
Congress has not expressed its intent on the fundamental compatibility or incom-
patibility of collective bargaining and any form of "therapy," so the court simply
lacked the basis on which to make an informed judgment in the area. Id. Faced
with the choice of "attempting to 'second guess' Congress on a political and philo-
sophical issue and relying on the broad, unequivocal language of the statute," the
court chose the latter, and accordingly, declined "to carve out an exception to the
plain language of section 2(3) of the Act." Id.
56. Houston, 244 N.L.R.B. at 1147; Cincinnati, 235 N.L.R.B. at 1449. See also
Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1374; Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 537.
57. Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1373-74; Houston, 244 N.L.R.B. at 1147; Cincinnati, 235
N.L.R.B. at 1448-49; Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 537.
58. That is, normal economic considerations are a significant factor in the em-
ployer-worker relationship. Houston, 244 N.L.R.B. at 1147; Cincinnati, 235
N.L.R.B. at 1449.
59. Houston, 244 N.L.R.B. at 1147; Cincinnati, 235 N.L.R.B. at 1449.
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permanent employer.60 The workshop was operated as a profit-
oriented business.61 These conditions reflected a workplace where
the interests of the worker were adverse to those of the employer.
The employer's interest in higher profits and productivity con-
flicted with the workers' interest in better wages, benefits, and
working conditions. These differences, the Board held, are the
"grist for the mill" of collective bargaining. 62
In contrast, the Board found that workers were not "employ-
ees" when their workshop was not run for financial gain and ac-
commodated its workers' needs more than did typical workshops.
In Goodwill Industries, the Board concluded that the union's ob-
jective to represent the employees' best interests was "avowedly
and convincingly embraced by the Employer itself."63 Goodwill's
"ultimate hope [was] that its clients [would] find employment in
private competitive industry." 64 To that end a job placement spe-
60. Houston, 244 N.L.R.B. at 1147; Cincinnati, 672 F.2d at 570.
61. Houston, 244 N.L.R.B. at 1145; Cincinnati, 235 N.L.R.B. at 1448.
62. "The panoply of working conditions and benefits which the Lighthouse has
paternalistically given to Workshop A employees are the normal and usual grist for
the mill of collective bargaining." Houston, 696 F.2d at 406 (interpreting Goodwill,
231 N.L.R.B. at 536). See also Cincinnati, 672 F.2d at 570.
63. 231 N.L.R.B. at 537. The Board added that the employer did have a "differ-
ence in emphasis as to how that goal should be accomplished." Id.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished the Houston workshop from
Goodwill's on the grounds that at Goodwill the
Board found that "rehabilitation" activities and goals permeated the
"employer-client" relationship, that productivity did not affect remu-
neration or tenure, that discipline was rarely invoked, that fifty per-
cent of job openings were reserved for short-term training of
individuals who would shortly move into the open market, and that a
formal, full-time placement program existed.
Houston, 696 F.2d at 406. There the Board concluded that the "employer's primary
objectives are the converse of a normal employer's objectives-so much so that
Goodwill might better be classified as a vocational clinic than as a viable en-
trepreneurial concern," and that permitting collective bargaining would "risk a
harmful intrusion on the rehabilitative process." Id. On the other hand, the Hous-
ton workshop's environment and working conditions were typical of those work-
shops in which collective bargaining was appropriate. Id.
In Cincinnati the court echoed the Board to the effect that Goodwill involved
a rare workplace in which the employer's concern for employee well-being dis-
placed the need for a union-implying that in most employment, including most
other workshops, employers are not concerned with employees' interests. Cincin-
nati, 672 F.2d at 573. Next, the court emphasized Goodwill's placement of workers
into the "competitive market" as opposed to the Cincinnati workshop's offering
"long-term employment with little emphasis on the acquistion of skills other than
those required for Workshop production." Id. Third, at Goodwill "counseling and
other social services were an integral part of a worker's relationship with the em-
ployer," making the work program and its resulting production "one element of the
rehabilitation plan, not an enterprise in itself." Id. (quoting 235 N.L.R.B. at 1448).
On the other hand, workers at the Cincinnati workshop had access to social serv-
ices only to the same extent as other blind members of the community. Id.
64. Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 536.
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cialist worked full-time seeking jobs for clients outside the work-
shops.65 Goodwill also kept a "client's" job open while he or she
was "sent out on a 1-month trial basis" to outside employment so
that the client could return if unable to adjust.66 This practice was
intended to relieve pressure on the client as well as encourage pri-
vate employers to extend job offers to clients which they might
not be willing to make otherwise.6 7 Goodwill's actions convinced
the Board that the overriding concern of the workshop was reha-
bilitating the workers.6m Because it assumed that collective bar-
gaining interferes with the rehabilitation process, the Board
declined to extend NLRA coverage to the workers.69
In Key, the Board focused on rehabilitation goals as only one
factor leading to the conclusion that "Key does not employ clients
with the intention or expectation that it will benefit from their
output. Rather, Key provides the clients with tasks that result in
marketable output solely for the clients' benefit."70 First, the
Board stressed that Key's sole purpose was to provide work reha-
bilitation and work-based therapy to handicapped persons. 71 The
"intended product" was the improvement in the client's well-be-
ing; the services and goods produced by the clients were "merely
part of the process for benefiting those same clients."72 Second,
Key conducted its business in keeping with that purpose and ac-
cepted clients according to their potential benefit from the pro-
grams.73 Third, Key lost money on its contracts.74 For these
reasons the Board concluded that Key's workers were "not the
kind of workers the Act is intended to cover."7 As in Goodwill,
the Board interpreted the Act to be concerned with remedying the
exploitation of workers. Because the Board found that the work-
shops in Key and Goodwill benefited rather than exploited their
workers, and that collective bargaining was therefore unnecessary






69. Id. at 537-38. The Board stated, however, that workshops such as Goodwill's
are the rare exception to the rule that a union better represents workers' interests
than does the employer. Id. at 537.
70. 265 N.L.R.B. at 1374.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. This practice is "the very reverse of the normal hiring standard, which





II. Critique of the Board's Theory and Its Application
The Board espouses a common principle in the four cases-
that the rehabilitative nature of a workshop precludes the need for
collective bargaining. Under this formulation the workers' status
under the Act depends upon a workshop's articulated goals rather
than its accomplishments and the reality of working conditions.76
In taking such an approach, the Board has denied sheltered work-
ers the protection of the NLRA without reference to the workers'
actual needs and has deferred to the workshops to assure that
those needs are met. The Board's position violates the spirit of the
Act, which is to protect the right to unionize for those workers
who would benefit from collective bargaining.77
76. See supra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
77. Two purposes animated the passage of the Act: (1) to eliminate disruptions
to interstate commerce caused by labor unrest and (2) to establish and protect
workers' rights to organize into unions and to bargain collectively. 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1982); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937). One goal was intended to
achieve the other. In the era of violent and widespread labor disputes of the 1930's,
Congress realized that collective bargaining was the most effective means for "pro-
moting industrial harmony." NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop., Inc., 446 F.2d 602,
608 (8th Cir. 1971) (quoting NLRB v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 444 F.2d 783, 788 (4th Cir.
1971)).
The provisions of the NLRA operate to equalize the bargaining power between
employees and employers and thereby achieve the broader purpose of the Act: to
eliminate disruptions of interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The theory
was that workers would gain leverage to improve their wages and working condi-
tions, and that satisfied workers would not find it necessary to strike or otherwise
interfere with the workplace. Collective bargaining is a procedure designed to pro-
duce collective agreements between employers and accredited representatives of
employees concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, and "re-
quires that parties deal with each other with open and fair minds and sincerely en-
deavor to overcome obstacles existing between the employer and the employees to
the end that employment relations may be stabilized and obstruction to the free
flow of commerce prevented." Rapid Roller Co. v. NLRB, 126 F.2d 452, 460 (7th
Cir. 1942) (quoting NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1941)). Em-
ployees are given rights to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining in the
heart of the NLRA, which provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
If an employee is covered by the NLRA, the Board will protect her or his
rights enumerated above by making it unlawful for an employer to interfere with
the exercise of those rights, by supervising representation elections and certifying
elected unions, and by ordering the employer to collectively bargain with the certi-
fied representative union. Id. § 158(a)(1), (5). If employees are covered, they or a
labor organization acting on their behalf may petition the Board to hold a represen-
tation election. Id. § 159(c)(1)(A). The provisions of the Act ensure that the elec-
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The Board's reasoning is based on the fear that collective bar-
gaining would "risk a harmful intrusion on the rehabilitative pro-
cess,"'7 8 by distorting "the unique relationship" between employer
and sheltered workers and impairing "the Employer's ability to ac-
complish its salutary objectives." 79 The Board implicitly assumes
that a union would press only for traditional economic benefits
and would sacrifice rehabilitation objectives for higher wages.8 0
This view embodies a substantive distinction between the
benefits of a rehabilitation program and the benefits sought
through collective bargaining. The Board itself has difficulty
maintaining such a distinction. For example, in Goodwill the
Board asserts that an employer's attempts to keep workers em-
ployed for as long as necessary is part of the workshop's rehabilita-
tive program.8 1 This is one characteristic of the workshop's
operation upon which the Board relies to conclude that a work-
shop is more concerned with workers' needs than with normal
business considerations.8 2 The Board also warns in Goodwill, how-
ever, that a union demand for unlimited employment tenure
would impair the employer's ability to accomplish its salutary
objectives.8 3 Another example is a statement in Goodwill charac-
terizing wages to be "as much an instrument of the rehabilitative
process as they are recompense for productive activity."8 4 This
statement is inconsistent with the warning that union pressure for
higher wages would interfere with rehabilitation. By creating a
false distinction between a benefit as part of a rehabilitation pro-
gram and the benefit as an element of a union's agenda for work-
ers, the Board has clearly deferred to the employer's conception of
the needs of the sheltered workers.
The Board was also concerned that workshops might respond
tion is fair. If only a minority of employees vote in favor of unionization, the Board
will not certify any union to represent the employees. Thus, coverage under the
Act does not automatically result in unionized employees; rather, it offers an oppor-
tunity for employees to choose whether to unionize, without coercion that would
interfere with their free choice.
78. Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 537 (1977).
79. Id. at 538.
80. Id.; Key Opportunities, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1371, 1374 (1982). The difference,
if any, between these realms of workers' interests is concentrated in programs that
attempt to place workers in outside employment. Maintaining a full-time place-
ment counselor, for example, is not a benefit ordinary workers value, but one shel-
tered workers prize. Although it is not a typical subject of collective bargaining,
none of the Board's arguments have explained why it should not be.
81. 231 N.L.R.B. at 537.
82. Id. In Key the Board relies upon similar characteristics to reach the same
conclusion. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.




to demands for higher wages by reducing the "client" workforce or
hiring more productive workers.8 5 Union demands for seniority
rights "might tempt the Employer to reconsider its policy of keep-
ing clients on as long as necessary" or reduce the number of handi-
capped workers receiving sheltered employment.86
The Board's premise that better wages and benefits to em-
ployees will actually hurt the employees is as old as unions.8 7 It is
the argument commonly raised by any employer facing the pros-
pect of an unwanted union election. The argument that workers
should not be allowed to unionize because the employer claims not
to be able to afford higher wages has absolutely no support in the
labor law.88 Moreover, it does not state reasons why sheltered
workers in particular should not be able to unionize.
Furthermore, the Board erroneously blames collective bar-
gaining for creating a conflict between different employment prac-
tices and thereby impairing the rehabilitative process.8 9 The
Board is concerned that union demands would create a tension be-
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. The argument was used in the first American labor court case, which arose
from the 1805 cordwainers' (footwear crafters) strike in Philadelphia. The eight
leaders of an organized strike were charged with criminal "conspiracy to raise their
wages." The prosecution's major argument was that organizing into a union would
destroy the industry. The "masters" could stand the loss but the workers would be
ruined, the prosecutor argued. Walter Nelles, The First American Labor Case, 41
Yale L.J. 165, 165-85 (1931).
88. Under the Act the Board's function is to determine if workers may unionize
with reference to the definitions in the Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982). The Act's
other provisions revolve around the paramount right established in the statute:
employees' "right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). No limitations on that right depend on
the parties' respective economic positions. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
On the contrary, the Board oversteps its bounds when it tries to regulate what
economic weapons a party might summon to its aid. Archibald Cox, Good Faith in
Collective Bargaining, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1409 (1958). If the Board can regulate
that, it would be in a position to exercise considerable influence upon the substan-
tive terms on which the parties contract. Our labor policy is not presently erected
on a foundation of government control of the results of negotiations. Id. The legis-
lative intent behind the Act does not "contain a charter for the NLRB to act at
large in equalizing disparities of bargaining power between employer and union."
NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960).
The Board itself recognizes that "[t]he presence of economic weapons in re-
serve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the
system that the [NLRA has] recognized." Id. at 489. Economic force can be de-
scribed as "a prime motive power for agreements in free collective bargaining." Id.
(quoting G.W. Taylor, Government Regulation of Industrial Relations 18 (1948)).
Economic force has no part, however, in deciding whether certain workers may
unionize.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 81-86. In all of the cases the Board ad-
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tween providing employment to as many workers as possible and
employing each worker for as long as possible. Such tensions,
however, exist independently of collective bargaining. Because
workshops have limited resources, each salutary objective already
impairs the possibility of achieving the other. Although the Board
implicitly assumes that the two policies cannot peacefully coexist,
in reality a workshop must continually balance such priorities.
Therefore, union demands through collective bargaining would no
more prejudice the employer's rehabilitative efforts than do the
competing pressures to which the employer is already subject.
Alternatively, the Board may not be arguing that collective
bargaining would create new tensions in a workshop. Rather, the
Board is choosing the workshop's judgment over the bargaining
process to strike the balance of employment policies. Such defer-
ence exceeds the Board's authority under the NLRA. Congress
limited the Board's function to determining the status of workers
and their workplaces within the Act's definitions. 90 The Board
should not condition NLRA protection upon its discretionary judg-
ment that a union or the workshop will best safeguard workers'
interests.9 ' Instead, the crucial factors should be the workers'
needs and their potential benefit from union representation.
The Board's bias toward the employer's perspective is further
evidenced by the manner in which the Board applies its own the-
ory. The Board relies on a workshop's articulated purpose and its
hered to the principle that collective bargaining impairs the rehabilitative process.
See supra notes 52-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases.
90. The provisions material to representation elections allow the Board only to
determine if the workers are employees and other definitions are met, and if a bar-
gaining unit is composed of appropriate employees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 159(b) (1982).
If so, the Board must proceed to certify a union as representative or hold an elec-
tion. Id. § 159(c). The only guidance within the Act for interpreting the definitions
are the policy statement in section 1 (see infra note 105) and the provisions as a
whole. From these sources emanate Congress' intention that workers regain some
control over their employment conditions, not that the Board should defer to em-
ployers' traditional dominance in the relationship.
91. The Board flaunts precedent by deciding on these grounds. The major cases
hold that employees' status under the Act is determined by examining the charac-
ter of the work they perform for their employer. Bayside Enters., Inc. v. NLRB,
429 U.S. 298, 303 (1977). For example, managerial employees are defined as those
"who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making op-
erative [the] decisions of their employer." NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267, 286 (1974). In the seminal decision of NLRB v. Hearst Publications, the Board
decided that newsboys were employees and not independent contractors because of
the nature of their work. 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944). For example, they worked con-
tinuously and regularly and relied upon their earnings for support; their wages
were influenced greatly by the publishers; and their hours of work and job efforts
were supervised by the publishers. Id. In addition, the policy and purposes of the
Act would be fulfilled by finding them to be employees. Id. at 132.
1985]
Law and Inequality
material gain rather than the realities of the workers' needs. Con-
sidering the employer's articulated objectives rather than the ac-
tual facts is an unprecedented manner of determining status under
the Act.92
The Board ignores facts which demonstrate that sheltered
workers have valid and traditional grievances about their working
conditions. For example, the Board did not consider that workers
were earning an average of only one dollar per hour in one work-
shop.93 The Board's finding of a rehabilitative objective also fails
to consider the workshop's actual rate of success in helping work-
ers become more capable of independently earning their
livelihoods.94
In Key, the Board stated "that Key makes every effort to
train its clients so that they may leave Key for better paying jobs
elsewhere," but "relatively few of Key's clients are able to obtain
nonsheltered employment and some of the clients" in fact stay with
Key 'indefinitely.' "95 Also, the Goodwill decision states that many
of the clients "suffer[ed] from disabilities which are not readily
curable," and for that reason one-half of the jobs were reserved for
long-term employment.9 6 In other words, many of the workers
92. By looking at one party's subjective motivations, the Board is deeming in-
tent to be crucial. Nothing in the NLRA's provisions or underlying purposes sug-
gest that an employer's intent to represent workers' interests is relevant to the
workers' coverage under the Act. Rather, the Act provides that the exclusive rep-
resentatives of workers in a unit shall be those "[r]epresentatives designated or se-
lected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees .. " 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
93. Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1373.
94. See supra notes 49-75 and accompanying text for discussion of the central
thesis that the Board's determination of employee status ignores the workers' ac-
tual functioning as employees, as well as the workshops' failure to rehabilitate the
"clients."
95. 265 N.L.R.B. at 1374.
96. 231 N.L.R.B. at 537. Furthermore, even if the Key and Goodwill workshops
did concentrate on rehabilitating some of their workers, the portion of workers in
long-term employment could be an appropriate bargaining unit alone. See 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1982). In Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, the Board granted
NLRA coverage to Workshop A, which employed approximately 70 individuals, 63
of whom were blind, and had certain production standards. 244 N.L.R.B. 1144, 1147
(1979). Workshop B, which included "approximately 30 individuals who [were] se-
verely handicapped in addition to being blind and who [were] not engaged in sub-
stantial production work for sale," was not seeking to unionize. Lighthouse for the
Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1983). The Board was amenable to ap-
proving a unit comprised of only one part of the workshop. 244 N.L.R.B. at 1147.
Of course, in Goodwill, the long-term workers were characterized as the "un-
curable" handicapped, while in Houston, Workshop A workers were those who had
already "graduated" from Workshop B or had started at a higher level of ability.
Houston, 696 F.2d at 402. Despite these labels, the long-term workers in Goodwill
were engaged in "substantial production work for sale," within the meaning of
Houston, 696 F.2d at 402, and may not have been any more disabled than Houston's
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could never be rehabilitated or moved into private industry. None-
theless, the Board concluded that the focus of the workshop was
"upon rehabilitating its clients and preparing them for work in pri-
vate competitive industry, not on producing a product for profit."
97
Even when the Board concluded that the concern of a work-
shop was rehabilitation, the Board essentially excused the work-
shop for not achieving this objective. Thus the Board's decisions
are swayed by a workshop's asserted objectives rather than its ac-
tual achievements. Such deference to workshops is both unprece-
dented and violates the spirit of the NLRA.
III. An Alternative Theory: The Functional Test
The Board's interpretation of the meaning of "employee" for
sheltered workers rings hollow. It ignores the workers' overall
needs and therefore does not lead to decisions that ameliorate the
workers' conditions. A fairer and simpler approach would be to
look at the workshop from the workers' perspective. The Board
should use a functional test that determines employee status ac-
cording to workers' capacities and needs. The functional test
presumes that workers who can handle the responsibilities of a
steady job, perform the same tasks as ordinary workers, and who
are subject to the harm the NLRA was intended to rectify, should
receive the Act's benefits.
The test contains two parts. First, the test requires workers
to function as employees in the ordinary sense of the term. Any
handicapped person who puts in a day's work under conditions
which are sufficiently similar to those at other workplaces so that
the workers are considered "generic" employees is capable of mak-
ing a reasoned choice regarding the structure of the workplace.
Determining workers' abilities according to how they function in
practice resolves the question the Board raised in dicta: "whether
the Act, which is predicated on the ability of employees to choose
to act or refrain from acting in concert with others, ought to apply
to persons so handicapped by mental or emotional abnormalities
that they can work only in a sheltered environment."98 A legal
Workshop A workers, some of whom had disabilities in addition to blindness. See
Houston, 696 F.2d at 402; Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 536-37.
97. Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 542 (1977).
98. Key Opportunities, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1371, 1375 (1982). In fact, because of
handicapped workers' history of lack of empowerment, and because of their intel-
lectual impairment, the workers probably speak better as a unit. Interview with
Richard Seuer, supra note 6. In Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 535, 537
(1977), some sheltered workers were at Goodwill because of their penal records and
many worked there because of physical disabilities. Neither "handicap" affects a
worker's capacity to make decisions.
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standard for competency already exists.99 The vast majority of
sheltered workers are considered legally competent to pay taxes,
to work at steady jobs, and otherwise to meet the obligations of re-
sponsible citizensoo The standard of competence to organize with
others to improve wages and benefits should not be stricter.
The second part of the test asks whether the workers receive
inadequate compensation and work benefits and whether these
grievances are appropriate subjects for collective bargaining.' 0 '
Workers who are subject to the exploitive conditions the NLRA
was intended to remedy1 02 will meet the second part of the test.
The functional test is not so relaxed as to find every shel-
tered worker to be an employee protected by the NLRA. For ex-
ample, those who would not be functional employees would
probably include legally incompetent people who would be ex-
cluded not because of their legal status as incompetent but by vir-
tue of the diminished level of activities they are able to perform.
Handicapped individuals in purely training programs whose work-
shop schedule consisted of attending classes on various subjects
such as hygiene, interpersonal communication, and work skills
training would not be employees because true employees spend
the bulk of their time producing goods or services.' 03 The test, not
unlike the Board's approach to the statutory definition of em-
ployee, would exclude those who are not employees in the generic
sense of the term. 0 4
The advantage of the functional approach is its potential for
99. Interview with Richard Seuer, supra note 6. For example, under Minnesota
probate law, any person over 18 "who is of sound mind may make a will." Minn.
Stat. § 524.2-501 (1984). Sound mind or capacity has been interpreted to mean that
when making the will, testator understands the nature, situation, and extent of his
[or her] property and claims of others on his [or her] bounty or his [or her] remem-
brance, and he [or she] is able to hold these things in his [or her] mind long enough
to form a rational judgment concerning them. Matter of Estate of Congdon, 309
N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn. 1981).
100. Interview with Richard Seuer, supra note 6.
101. Compare analysis in Key, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1371, discussed supra notes 70-75
and accompanying text, with Goodwill, 231 N.L.R.B. at 536, discussed supra notes
63-69 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 77.
103. These programs include work component, work activity, and work adjust-
ment training, programs which use production work and training in work-related
behaviors to develop the client's optimal functioning based on the recommendations
developed during vocational evaluation. Minnesota Evaluation, supra note 5, at 18.
The client may participate in production work and may also attend classes for the
"development of work related behaviors such as appropriate attitudes and work
habits, physical endurance, and orientation to the job market." Id. See also supra
notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
104. Key Opportunities, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1371, 1374 (1982); Goodwill Indus. of S.
Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 537 (1977).
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curing the hardships sheltered workers face beyond the struggles
inherent in being handicapped in the eyes of society. The test
would help extend the Act's protection and the right to unionize to
those workers who lack bargaining power in the workplace.
105
The functional test approach thereby comports with the ac-
cepted legal theory that those who should be protected by the law
are those who suffer the injuries the law was designed to rem-
edy.106 Specifically, the test reflects the United States Supreme
Court's directive that the meaning of the word "employee" under
the NLRA "takes color from its surroundings in the statute where
it appears," 107 and derives meaning from the context of that stat-
ute which "must be read in the light of the mischief to be cor-
rected and the end to be attained." 0 8 The NLRB's mandate from
Congress is to protect the bargaining power of employees in order
to ensure that workers will attain satisfactory rewards for their
labor.109
The equitable argument in favor of the functional test is that
it will allow more workers to unionize in a particularly exploitive
industry. The Board would agree that it is desirable for either a
union or the employer to represent the workers' interests. Union
representation, however, does not merely substitute one paternal-
istic entity, the union, for another, the employer. Unionization is
preferable to the existing system which allows the employer to de-
cide that it is in the best interests of sheltered workers not to pay
them a living wage. Unionization also has advantages absent from
other forms of government intervention to improve workers'
wages and benefits."l0 The NLRA's provisions for unionization do
105. The findings and policies set forth in the introduction to the Act state:
[e]xperience has proved that protection by law of the right of employ-
ees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from in-
jury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce
by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest,
by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of in-
dustrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other
working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power be-
tween employers and employees....
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
106. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944); NLRB v. Wheel-
ing Elec. Co., 444 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1971).
107. Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 144-45 (6th Cir. 1977) (quoting
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940)).
108. Id. at 145 (quoting South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251
(1940)).
109. See supra note 77.
110. For example, most welfare or government benefit programs directly dis-
tribute, however inadequately, income or services, which do not provide the recipi-




not shelter workers from the hardships of a capitalist society. In-
stead, they facilitate and uphold the rights of workers to join to-
gether to communicate their common interests through one voice,
to increase their influence in their own workplaces, and to help
close the gap in bargaining power between employer and
employee.111
The functional test might also be part of a broader solution to
the inequitable treatment of sheltered workers by deterring em-
ployers from treating sheltered workers as second-class workers.
Critics might argue that employers would no longer provide even a
facade of rehabilitation because to do so would not improve their
case against unionization, as it would under the NLRB's current
standard. If, however, the workers received low wages under the
sheltered workshop exception to the minimum wage and were not
receiving training to enable them to move into private industry,
these facts would constitute grievances well-suited to the bargain-
ing table and would create a good case for unionization.1 12 Thus
the functional test should provide a remedy for sheltered workers
who labor for low wages, without job security or benefits, under a
false hope of being rehabilitated.
In Goodwill Industries, the Board stated that the workshop
furnished numerous services to its employees "[a]s part of its ef-
fort to foster dignity and self-confidence among its clients."
113
But, especially for the handicapped, whom society is convinced are
inevitably dependent, dignity comes not from charity but from tak-
ing charge of one's life and helping to determine one's future.
Many of the workers at the Minnesota workshop belong to an ad-
vocacy organization, Advocating Change Together (ACT), which
111. As early as 1921 the United States Supreme Court recognized that it is a
reality of modern industrialism that unions are essential for achieving equality of
bargaining power between employers and workers.
Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We said that
they were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a single
employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was de-
pendent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself
and family; that if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he
thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and re-
sist arbitrary treatment; that union was essential to give laborers op-
portunity to deal on an equality with their employer.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 34 (1937) (gender-specific pronouns in origi-
nal) (citing American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 157 U.S.
184, 209 (1921)). See also infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
112. Compensation, disciplinary practices, work schedules and requirements,
benefits, and work tenure are the typical "grist for the mill" of collective bargain-
ing. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d 399, 406 (5th Cir.
1983).
113. 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 537 (1977).
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takes the view that people labeled "mentally retarded" can often
fend for themselves.114 As one former ACT organizer stated, "If
we continue to create an environment of dependence, we will cre-
ate dependent people." 115 Handicapped workers' proven efforts to
overcome society's expectation of dependency should be supported
and legitimated by extending to handicapped workers the same
legal rights to choose to unionize and bargain collectively to which
other workers are entitled.
114. Minneapolis Star, Dec. 9, 1981, at Cl, col. 5. Many of its members have left
sheltered workshops against the advice of their supervisors and have found work in
the private sector.
115. Id.

